At least since the work of Becker (1965) , it has been recognized widely that time may play an important role in eonsumer demand. One of the areas where this may be most significant empirically is in the valuation of natural resource amenities through their associated recreation demands. A principal reason is that recreation is a time-intensive commodity, so that the value ofthetimcspcnt in recreation would be expected to play a large role in its overall value. The potential bias to consumer's surplus estimates of the neteconomic value of recreation from excluding time "prices" from the demand model has been recognized from the outset, for example by Knetsch (1963) and Clawson (1959) .
I, INTRODUCTION
At least since the work of Becker (1965) , it has been recognized widely that time may play an important role in eonsumer demand. One of the areas where this may be most significant empirically is in the valuation of natural resource amenities through their associated recreation demands. A principal reason is that recreation is a time-intensive commodity, so that the value ofthetimcspcnt in recreation would be expected to play a large role in its overall value. The potential bias to consumer's surplus estimates of the neteconomic value of recreation from excluding time "prices" from the demand model has been recognized from the outset, for example by Knetsch (1963) and Clawson (1959) .
To incorporate time into recreation demand models, researchers have generally adopted the practice suggested by McConnell (1975) of defining the '*fuir priceof recreation as the money cost of a trip plus its monetized time cost, though the use offuil" budgets alsocalled for by the Becker approach is less widespread. Bockstael et al.
*We thank Paul Mason and participants in the 74th
Annual WEA International Conference in San Diego for helpful comments, though any errors are our own. Commcnls by an anonymous reviewer improved the article considerably. (1987) pointed out quite clearly that both full budgets and full prices are required in the demand function if the recreationist is jointly choosing labor supply with recreation at an exogenous marginal wage, but that the structure of demand was unclear if the individual was not making such marginal labor supply choices (i.e., if he or she was working fixed hours). Subsequently, Larson and Shaikh (2001) showed that the full prices full budgets specification is sufficient to satisfy the constraints on demand parameters that arise because choice is made subject lo two binding constraints, regardless of the individual's position in the labor market. They also pointed out that models that use full prices but only money income (in effect ignoring the role of time as a resource eonstraint) cannot be consistent with the requirements of choice subject to two constraints.
Lar
Although the outlines of how time should enter the structure of demand are becoming clear, a major unresolved issue is how to determine its value in practice. Several studies have followed the basic logic of Becker's early work, assuming that the opportunity cost of recreation time (i.e., the value of other time forgone in favor of recreation) is an exogenous parameter, such as the average wage rate or. more commonly, some fraction thereof This fraction is either chosen arbitrarily or estimated as part of the recreation demand model, as in Cesario (1976) , McConnell and Strand (1981) , and Smith etal. (1983) .
Such assumptions may be erroneous for a variety of reasons. Assuming the average wage is the appropriate opportunity cost of time presumes that the individual faces no constraints on hours worked, derives no utility or disutility from work, and has a linear wage function, as has been noted by Chiswick (1967) , Bockstael et al. (1987) , and Smith et al. (1983) . This is unlikely to be true for many people. Assuming some constant fraction of the wage is the opportunity cost of time, especially an arbitrarily chosen fraction, also seems likely to be incorrect for most people. For all of these reasons, an individual's average wage does not necessarily reveal anything about the shadow value of discretionary leisure time, either as an upper or lower bound.
In a recent advance. Feather and Shaw (2000) adapted the Heckman (1974) labor supply model to include information supplied by recreationists about their labor supply status. in particular whether they felt under-or overemployed relative to their desired number of hours. This information is used to identify subgroups in thedata for which the shadow value of leisure time is less than the wage or more than the wage, which helps in the estimation of both a wage function and a shadow value of leisure time function. This approach produces individual-specific estimates of the opportunity cost of leisure time, based on their demographics and labor market decisions, which are used in a subsequent recreation demand analysis.
The Feather-Shaw work is a substantial improvement in assessing the shadow value of time by allowing it to diverge from the individual's wage rate in predictable ways. Like most of the other literature, the FeatherShaw marginal value of time is determined outside the recreation demand model: that is. it is identified in an auxiliary relationship (in their case, the individual's labor supply choice) and is used as a predetermined value in the recreation demand model. The marginal value oftime is not. then, responsive to changes in the parameters of the recreation choice problem, nor is it necessarily utility-consistent with the recreation demand function.
This article takes a different approach to incorporating the value oftime into recreation demand models by estimating a latent, endogenous marginal value oftime function jointly with recreation demand. In this approach, the consumer's observed choices, made in response to the constraints and prices he or she faces, reveal the marginal value of time consistent with those choices. The marginal value of time function is internally consistent with the demand model in that its functional form is consistent with the homogeneity and other curvature properties required for models of consumer choice subject to two binding constraints (in this case, a money constraint and a time constraint).
The article makes three contributions to the recreation demand literature. First, it is the first to estimate an endogenous marginal value of time jointly with observable behavior (in this case, recreation demands) in a utilityconsistent framework. To this end, the curvature properties required for the marginal value oftime function to be consistent with consumer choice subject to two constraints (on time and on money) are identified, and an empirical specification consistent with these properties is developed. Second, the marginal value of time function is specified so that it nests the other empirical approaches used in the recreation demand literature, which allows for tests of which approaches best explain the data. In particular, it permits (but does not require) a connection between the marginal value oftime and the individual's wage.
Finally, the accompanying demand model that embeds the marginal value of time function is, to our knowledge, the first application of the popular almost ideal demand system (AIDS) model of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) to the case of choice subject to two binding constraints. We show how the functional form of this demand model can be derived by tracing throtigh the dual relationships between the two expenditure functions and the indirect utiHty function that hold for the two-constraint choice model.
The empirical setting for the demandmarginal value of time model is California whale watching, an increasingly popular activity that takes place along Western shores during the months of Deeember-Aprii. Boats in ports along the California coast offer day trips of varying lengths that afford an opportunity for close-up viewing of the gray whale migration between the Bering Sea ofl' Alaska and the Gulf of California in Mexico. In addition, one can often glimpse the migration from many points on headlands along the coast.
II. BACKGROUND: THE TWO-CONSTRAINT RECREATION CHOICE MODEL
The two-constraint model used to motivate the analysis has its origins in the work of Beeker (1965) and DeSerpa (1971) and was used to analyze reereation ehoiees by Bockstael et al. (1987) . It can be interpreted, with minor modifieations, for either the ease where labor supply is predetermined relative to recreation choices or joint with them. The basic presentation is for predetermined labor supply, beeause many reereation choices are made conditional on (not jointly with) the individual's labor supply decision. The modifieations needed to incorporate joint labor supply are then briefly noted.
When labor supply is predetermined, reereation demands are part ofthe second stage of a two-stage budgeting process, which allocates the money and time resulting from the firststage labor supply deeision to all consumption activities. The money-budget M and time-budget T applicable to the recreation demand choice are therefore fixed.
Let u{x,s) be the individual's direct utility function, with x an /i-vector o^ consumption goods with corresponding money-prices p and time-prices t. Second-stage recreation ehoiees are made subjeet to strictly binding constraints on money-budget A/ -px and time-budget 7'=tx.
Attention is contlned to the case of two strictly binding constraints, which is not very restrictive for analyzing outdoor reereation, a time-intensive good whose time requirements have long been reeognized to have an opportunity eost. For time to have a value or opportunity cost, the constraint must be strictly binding. Additionally, nonsatiation is a sufficient condition for the money constraint tobind.OneeouId introduee cases in which one or both constraints go slack, though neither is very compelling for the analysis of reereation demand.' The existence of at least one numeraire good with respect to eaeh constraint is sufficient for both constraints to bind continuously." The individual's utility is also influeneed by an exogenous vector of 1. I f the time constraint goes slack, the money value of tioK" is zero and the standard single-constraint consumer problem results. If the money constraint goes slack, the value of time goes infinite and a standard consumer choice problem of allocating lime results. Morey (1984) provides an example of the latter choice problem applied to outdoor recreation.
2. Examples are goods, such as walks on the beach (requiring time but no money), or making charitable contributions (requiring money but no-or liUle-time). LaFrance and Hanemann (1989) These two Roy's identities are a source of parameter restrictions in the empirieal demand system and prove useful for speeification and identification of the marginal value of leisure time from demand system coefficients. Larson and Shaikh (2001) show that even when p = p(p, t, s., M.T) is an endogenous function of all parameters, these restrictions are satisfied by systems of demands that are functions of "full" priees Pj + p-tj, for / ^ 1 n. and 3. To consider labor supply choice joint with goods demands, dctinean element of x, say .t|, as hours worked. with a money price pi = w. where w is the wage, and it -1 (Bockstael etal, 1987) .
4. Subscripts that are parameters represent partial derivatives; for example, yi = d
.v/(p,t,s,M,n A result they derive, that is useful later, is that because the'full-budget'Marshallian demands are homogeneous of degree zero in (t, T), the relationship between the time and moneybudget slopes of (3) is (4) Equation (3) can be viewed as a structural form lor the empirical recreation demand function that satisfies the two-constraint choice requirements. By specifying a form for p(p,t,s. M. T) that is also consistent with the two-constraint choice requirements., one can directly estimate the endogenous marginal value of time function jointly with the parameters of demand. However, the properties ofp(p, t,s, A/, T) have not yet been articulated. Knowledge of these properties is needed to ensure that empirical specifications of p(p.t.s, A^,r) are internally consistent with Marshallian demands and that both are utilitytheoretic.
To develop the properties of the marginal value of time, it is necessary to consider the dual structure ofthe two-constraint model. Because choice is subject lo two constraints, the model has two dual expenditure functions, one minimizing money expenditure subject to utility and time constraints, the other minimizing time expenditure subject to utility and money constraints. The dual money expenditure function t?{p,t,s, T,u) is
where (t) = Cwisthemarginalmoneycostofutility and, in this problem, -y^ -e7-(p, t.s, 7", H) 5. For demand systems, the requirements are somewhat more stringent. The full-budget term must enter muliiplicativcly and have the same budget slope across all demands, and the (Marshallian) cross-full price effects must be symmeiric (Larson and Shaikh 2001) .
is the marginal value of additional time.'' The solution to (5) yields a set of money-compensated Hicksian demands, .Y,^'(p. t. s. 7".»). that vary money income to keep utility constant given fixed time-budget T.
The dual time expenditure function is defined as 
This equivalence ofthe dual expressions for the marginal value of time at the optimum is useful for analyzing the comparative statics of the marginal value of time function estimated as part ofthe recreation demand model.T hese dual expenditure functions have been defined and partially described for twoconstraint models by Smith (1986) but have not (to our knowledge) been used to analyze the comparative statics of the marginal value of time, nor for specifying utility-theoretic empirical two-constraint demand functions. These topics are taken up in the next two sections.
III. COMPARATIVE STATICS OF THE MARGINAL VALUE OF TIME
What, in fact, should one expect to be the "correct" signs on the derivatives of p(p, t,s, A/, r)? This section develops comparative statics of the marginal value of time function and shows that under the full prices, full budgets specification of demands, it must satisfy analogs to Roy's identity: the ratios of price to budget slopes of the Marshallian margitial value oftime ftinction equal the tiegative of corresponding quantity consumed.
By letting utihty vary in equation (7), the two identities (8) Differentiating both sides with respect to T. the time-budget slope of money compensated demand can be written as (13) Substituting (4) and (7) simplifies (13) 
result. These are useful in evaluating the comparative statics ofthe marginal value oftime.
Relating Money-Price and Money-Budget Slopes of the Marginal Value of Time
Consider first the money-budget and price slopes ofthe marginal value oftime. Differentiating (8) and (11) The cross-partial derivative er^ of the money expenditure function with respect to money-price p,-and time-budget T is also, by Young's theorem, the time-budget slope of money-compensated Hicksian demand, that is. (12) This interesting result shows that with a full-prices/full-budgcts Marshallian demand specification, the time-budget slope of Ihe money-compensated Hicksian demand is always zero at given (H, M, T) points. Because it is a local result rather than a global result about the demand function, though, the money-compensated Hicksian demands arc generally functions of T.B ecause of (14), the derivative f/ (p, t, s, T, u) is always zero in (11). Taking the ratio of (11) to (10), a fundamental result emerges. (15) Equation (15) is striking for the structure it reveals about the endogenous marginal value oftime function. The ratio of its money-price to money-budget slopes is the same as for the indirect utility function and equals the negative of corresponding quantity consumed, via Roy's identity.
9. This can be seen by noting ihat ihe equality ej{p,t.s. T.u)= -p(p, t,s, .W, T) holds only at a point. Liniess ulility is varied to keep money-budget constant (as in equation [8]). But the money-compensated Hicksian demand holds utility constant by definition.
Relating Time-Price and Time-Budget Slopes of the Marginal Value of Time
Parallel results hold for the time-budget arguments. By differentiating (9) with respect to time-budget Tand time-prices tjj= !,...«, (16) identity relating time-price and time-budget slopes.
( 17) where in (17) arguments of the functions common to (16) Differentiating with respect to M, Again substituting from (4) and (7), this time into (18),
which parallels the result in (14). As with the money-compensated Hicksian demands, the time-compensated Hicksian demands have zero money-budget slopes at given (;/, M, T) points.
As before, substituting (19) into (17) and taking the ratio of (17) to (16) 
yields the

Xs, M,T)/dtj] ,t,s, M,T)/dT] (20)
Equations (15) and (20) are the two principal results useful in specifying the marginal value oftime function. When the marginal value of leisure time is endogenous, a demand model with full prices and full budgets is sufficient (not necessary) to satisfy the two-binding constraint hypothesis. Given this demand specification, the marginal value of time satisfies analogs to the two Roy's identities given in (2): the ratio ofthe price to budget slopes within each constraint is the negative of the corresponding quantity consumed.
Implications for the Structure of the Marginal Value of Time Function
To identify a specification for p(p,t,s, M, 7") consistent with the requirements of equations (15) and (20) . it is useful to note that incomplete demand systems are estimated in practice. By introducing A*^^ and NT as numeraire goods such that p^^ = \. /A/ = 0, PT = O, and tT=U the budget constraints can be expressed as M = p\ = p'\' -j-NM and 7"=tx = t'x' + Nr with N/^f and A' y representing expenditures ofmoneyandtimeoutside the A/-good empirical demand system of interest, which explains x'.
Given this, a general structural specification for the marginal value oftime that satisfies (15) and (20) is™ (21) 
That is, given the parameters of the problem and the individual's optimal choices .v, the "revealed" value of time is a function of the discretionary money and time after expenditures are allocated to goods in the empirical incomplete demand system time and of the other shifters s.
10. This can be easily verified by noting that
so equation (15) holds. Similar results hold for (and T, so ihal equation (20) (21') cannot be estimated directly as part of the econometric system. However, it can be substituted directly into (3). yielding the Af-good implicit system (22) Equation (22) can be estimated given the empirical marginal value of time function Q-f(Nxf, Nj-.s) from (21) and suitable choices of functional forms for the goods x in the incomplete demand system.
IV. AN EMPIRICAL TWO-CONSTRAINT DEMAND MODEL
This section develops the first empirical application of a two-constraint version of the AIDS model of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) . This demand model has an endogenous marginal value of time consistent with the two-constraint requirements. The implicit demand system with endogenous marginal value of time described in (22) is considerably more general than recreation demand models estimated in practice: in fact, single-equation models are more the norm. After describing the general form of a two-constraint demand model, then a specific form for the marginal value of time is adopted and a singleequation version of the model is estimated empirically.
Beginning with any one of the optimized choice functions v(), e(), or ^(). one can derive the others from the dual structure of the optimization problem. It is most convenient to develop the dual structure in terms of the money cost function, in a manner similar to the development of the standard AIDS model. Let the money expenditure function be is the (money-compensated) Hicksian value of time function, =/?,+ p"(p,t,s,7') • are full prices formed using this value of time function.
The indirect utility function K(p,t,s, A/, T) dual to e(p,t,s. T,u) is'(
24) V{p,t,s,M,T)
where/Jy^ = Pj + p(/>,t,s, Af, T) • tj and A/^= M-l-p(p, t, s, M,T)T are full prices and full budget formed using the empirical (Marshallian) value of time function p(p, t, s. A/, 7"). It can be verified in (24) that '^r/^M~p(P-ts, A/, 7"), consistent with the definition of p(p, t,s, M,T) in (7). The time expenditure function corresponding to (23) 11. It is straightforward to show that -CTp*'{p, t.s, r.«) for this model, as required. Though T appears throughout (25) (p, t,s, M, a) is the timecompensated value of time funetion and/jj = p, + p^(p, t,s, M, u) • tj are full prices formed using this value of time function. The time expenditure funetion is a V-7" inverse with (24) and an M-T inverse with respeet to (23), and it can be verified that p^(p, t, s. A/, w) = -l/^A/(P'ts, A/, w), again eonsistent with (7).
The Implied Share Equations
DifTerentiating (25) 
s, M, T) • tj, are full priees and A/''= A/+p(p,t,s, A/, T)-T is full budget.
One ean also derive the same system from the time expenditure funetion (25), differentiating with respeet to tj and using the envelope result that .v,^ ^ c>^(p,t,s, M,u)/i)ti. Not surprisingly, no new information results because the two expenditure funetions are jointly dependent. The shares in (26) arc full shares beeause they are defined in terms of full priees pf and full budget A/''.
The form of the share model in (26) is essentially a generalization of the AIDS share model from single constraint choice. The arguments ofthe share equations are full priees and full budgets, and the conversion factor between time and money is the marginal value of time function that must satisfy the restrictions on its price and budget slopes in (15) and (20).
The Empirical Value of Time Eunction
Because so much ofthe reereation demand literature focuses on the connection between the marginal value of leisure time and the wage, it is natural to include the individual's wage as an argument of the vector of shifters s. The speeifieation should be flexible enough.
By substituting the indirect utility function in (24) for the utility term everywhere, the 13. It is defined as />/-[oo H-Ijocf logl/jf) ,2;yT^. log(pf) log(/)f) -f-\ l though, to allow for different effects of the wage on the marginal value of time for those who make a marginal labor supply decision (e.g., by working flexible hours) and those who don't (e.g., work fixed hours). Other individual characteristics may also be important. For example, it seems likely that the individual's age is a determinant of the marginal value of leisure time. The individual's avidity for the particular recreation activity could also play a role. With these observations and equation (21) in mind, the empirical marginal value oftime is (27) [So where f is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the individual works fixed hours and 0 otherwise. This specification recognizes that the individual's average wage, as well as the amounts of the numeraire goods Nxi and Nj-, are likely to atTect the marginal value of time in the full prices and full budgets; but the effects can be different for those working fixed versus flexible hours. One would expect that wage plays less of a role for those working fixed hours (i.e., 63 -0 and 5|, 52?^0) and more of a role for those working llexible hours and ofTering discretionary labor supply (i.e.. 617^0 and Q], 62 -0). If all individuals report their marginal wages correctly, one might further suppose that 63 -1.
In addition to Wage, two other shifters are included. Age and Avidity. Avidity is an index ranging from I (lowest) to 4 (highest) based on responses to several categorieal variables probing the individual's strength of opinion about the importance of preserving marine mammal populations.
The specification in (27) encompasses several approaches used for treating time in the empirical recreation demand literature. One is the approach suggested by MeConnell and Strand (1981) , which estimates the constant fraction of the wage rate that the marginal value oftime is assumed to represent. When 61-62 -(pi = <P2 ~ 0 and 9:^ -1. the value of time for individuals working flexible hours {F= 0) is and is the natural log of the constant wage fraction. More generally, of course, the fraction of the wage could vary with individual characteristics, which is accommodated by the less restrictive condition 63 = I, in which ease the marginal value of time for those working flexible hours is
Wage.
One could also estimate the value of time for those with fixed hours as a fraction of the wage, as (27) indicates, though this is less compelling because presumably there is less of a connection between the marginal value oftime and the wage for these people.
Another common approach is to assume that the marginal value ofleisure time is a fraction of the wage, with 1/4 to 1/2 often used in practice by reference to the value of time saved in transportation studies (e.g., Cesario 1976 ). This type of assumption is also easily evaluated as the additional restriction on (28) that 9() -ln(A'), where k is the value to be tested. To test whether time is valued at zero, one can replace exp(9o) in (28) with a constant ic and test whether K -0.
The data used to illustrate the model are from on-site intercepts of whale watchers at four sites in California during the winter 1991-92. The survey instrument was pretested using individuals who had gone whale watching in the previous year. It collected information on trips taken so far that season, expected future trips, travel time, travel costs, whether the trip was their primary destination, and so on. Also collected was information including actual contributions to marine mammal groups; time spent reading, watching, or thinking about wildlife and whales; as well as purchases of whale-related merchandise. Last, demographic information including work status, wage rates, and income was asked. The survey was presented in booklet form.
In total. 1.402 visitor surveys were handed out, and 1,003 were returned, for an overall response rate of 71.3%. The response rate 14. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this simpler test.
was reasonably similar across the four locations, varying from a low of 65.2% for intercepts at Point Loma (San Diego) to a high of 80.3% for intercepts at Point Reyes. On-site refusals were not a problem. For e.xample. at Point Reyes, only 10 people of roughly 600 contacted (about 1.6%) refused to take a survey packet.
The empirical demand system focuses on estimating the budget share for whale watching trips but recognizes there are related actions individuals can take with respect to whale and marine mammal populations. These are the expenditure ofone's time or money to contribute to the maintenanee or enhancement of gray whale populations. The relative prices of these other actions differ across the popuiation and therefore may affect the frequency of whale watching trips taken, just as substitute prices affect consumption of other goods. Augmenting the single-equation incomplete demand/ share equation for trips arc the two numeraire goods A' and A', the residual expenditures of time and money from their respective budgets after accounting for trips.
The own (full) price of whalewatching trips (A) is the money cost of travel to the site and while on site, plus the time costs of travel (hours traveled and spent on site) valued at the (endogenous) marginal value of time.''' Thus the full priceof.vis/?f -t-p{Nm.Nr.s) • t\, where/?] is the money cost ofthe trip and/1 is the time cost ofthe trip, or the trip length. Monetary donations have a money price because charitable contributions are tax-deductible at both the federal and state level, so the marginal price of a dollar donation is less than a dollar and varies across individuals according to household income. These donations do not have a significant time-price, so the full price of donations is just the money cost of donating; that is, P2 -T. where T is the marginal tax rate for the individual. Both California and federal taxes were included in figuring T for each individual, based on their total household income category.
Time donations (.v^) have a time-price ^i > 1, measured by the total number of hours required to deliver an hour of time to the volunteer organization. Total time may be higher 15. Time on site is taken to be exogenous because all irips covered in this analysis are day trips and roughly half of all whale watching trips represented are boat trips of fixed duration. because of transactions time costs from driving back and forth, and so on. Because we don't have information on how this time-price will differ across individuals in our sample, we take thetime-price?i= 1 for all. There may also be a money cost p^ of time donations, which would represent the money costs of driving to and from the site where volunteering occurs and other transactions costs of donating time. We have no information on this variable from our sampie but suspect it is small, thus it is taken to be zero. Thus price pj, = 0, and the full price of time donations is p^ - (NM,NT,S), which varies across the sample based on differences in individual characteristics.
In addition to the time-and money-prices, it isexpected that the individual's whale watching success will inlluence both trips demand and potentially the willingness to make donations of time and money. The success variable (r) is the individual's ex ante expectation of whale sightings for the trip when they were contacted. Money-budget (M) is the household income before taxes, and the time-budget (T) is the amount of nonworking time measured as the number of weekend and paid vacation days. Table 1 provides some descriptive information on these variables used in the estimation model.
Results
The empirical model consists ofthe demand share for whale watching trips (equation [26] ) with the marginal value of time function {equation [27]) embedded in the full prices and budgets ofthe share equation. It was estimated using nonlinear least squares in SAS version 6.12. Stone's price index (Stone 1954) was used for the deflator.
Estimation results for the full model are given in Table 2 . The model is highly significant overall, and most coefficients individually are significant at the a = 0.05 level. The share coefficients indicate that demand is price inelastic (with mean own-full price elasticity of -0.31) and income elastic (with mean full income elasticity of 0.66). Expected sightings have a signiftcant positive effect on trips share, and time donations are a substitute for trips, whereas money donations are complementary with trips. There are significant site-specific effects at the two northernmost sites. Point Reyes and Half Moon Bay. "Estimated with one free constant such that p = K.
Within the value of time function, it is clear that the parameter vectors are different for those who work fixed versus flexible hours. For those who work ftxed hours, the time constraint was the most important determinant of the marginal value of time. As one would expect, wage is not a significant determinant ofthe marginal value of time for these individuals. In contrast, for those working flexible hours, the most important factors in the marginal value of time are the wage rate and the money-budget constraint. Age has a significant negative effect on the marginal value of time, controlling for budget and other effects, and avidity also has a negative sign but is not statistically significant. Table 3 presents the results of hypothesis tests on the treatment of the marginal value of time. The first hypothesis test is whether personal characteristics (in our case. Age and Avidity) make a signiftcant difference to an individual's marginal value of time. The X" statistic for the restrictions that coefficients of these variables are zero is 9.90, exceeding the critical x^05' which is 5.99. The hypothesis that personal characteristics are irrelevant is therefore rejected.
The rest of Table 3 explores the implications of using various conventional treatments of the value of time. These are nested within the endogenous value of time model and can be tested as parameter t estrictions on the more general model. If the parameter restrictions corresponding to alternative conventional treatments are not rejected, one can say that there is no additional explanatory power from the more general model. If. on the other hand, the parameter restrictions are rejected, one can conclude that the more general endogenous marginal value of time model is preferred.
From Table 3 , one can see that assuming the marginal value of time is a fraction ofthe wage is rejected., because the x^ test statistics for four different variants of this assumption exceed the a -5"A> critical values. The most general assumption, that those working fixed and flexible hours have a difTerent fraction, with both estimated in the model, is rejected, as is the additional restriction that the fraction be the satTie for both groups. Similarly, using two common assumptions in the literature (that time is valued at 1/3 the wage and at zero) are also rejected. These results indicate that the endogenous marginal value of time model does a significantly better job of explaining trips shares than do the conventional treatments.
It is interesting to ask what relationship the model estimates ofthe marginal value of time have with the individual's reported wage category. Table 2 indicates a strong link to the wage for individuals working flexible hours, as one would expect. The parameter estimate on ln( Wage), O^., is the elasticity of the marginal value of time with respeet to wage, which is 0.886. This means that for every 1% increase in the wage, the marginal value of time for individuals working flexible hours increases by 0.89%. This is a partial clTect, however, that doesn't account for other changes in money income and discretionary time-budget that are induced by changes in hours worked. Figure 1 graphs the model estimates of mean marginal value of time by wage category and labor class, along with error bars representing the 95% confidence intervals. The mean estimates are conditional sample means and take the estimated parameters as given, so the eonfidence intervals reported refleet the effeets of variations in individual eharaeteristies on the mean value of time estimates. The numbers used in Figure I are also presented in Table 4 . Figure 1 illustrates two interesting findings of the empirieal model. First, marginal values
FIGURE 1
Values of Time by Wage Group of time for both labor elasses {fixed and fiexible hours worked) diverge signifieantly from the wage at moderate to high wages (above about $17.5O/h). There is a modest increase in mean marginal value of time with wage for flexible hours workers but no diseernible trend for fixed hours workers (Table 4) . Overall, the relationship of the marginal value of time to the wage is more complex than most models in the literature allow, with the marginal value of time exceeding the wage for low wage rates and less than the wage for high wage rates. That is, the ratio of the marginal value of time to the wage deereases with increasing wage.
The second interesting finding is that there is not a statistically significant differenee between the marginal values of time for fixed versus flexible hours workers. This is due in part, no doubt, to the fact that when the data are disaggregated into many subsets, the confidenee intervals widen beeause the number of observations used for each statistic decreases. It may also refleet the fact that schedules are not strictly fixed for any workers in the long run, so that when a serious imbalance between the wage and the marginal value of time arises, an adjustment of hours worked oecurs to bring them more in line.
The key point is the flexibihty of the endogenous marginal value of time approach to better represent the complex relationship of the marginal value of time to individual's eonstraints and opportunities. Figure 1 illustrates this flexibility of the model to represent elements of two approaches to the marginal value of time in the literature: the conventional assumption ofa constant fraction of the wage, and the approach of inferring a constant travel tirne value for all individuals in the sample (e.g., Hausman et al. 1995) . The patterns of time values are revealed by the data on choices, prices, and constraints, rather than being imposed a priori.
VI. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS. AND EXTENSIONS
This article has developed an approach to estimate an endogenous marginal value of time function jointly with recreation demands. It identifies the structural requirements that endogenous marginal values of time tnust satisfy to be consistent with the hypothesis of choice subject to two binding constraints. An analog to Roy's identities for the twoconstraint model holds for the endogenous marginal value of tirne function, wherein the ratios of time-price slopes to time-budget slope of the marginal value of time function equal the negative of corresponding quantities consumed, which also equal the ratios of moneyprice slopes to money-budget slope. We propose a functional form for the endogenous marginal value of time that nests the other main empirical specifications in the literature, and estimate this function jointly with the recreation demand share in a two-constraint version of the AIDS. The approach is attractive econotnetrically because joint estimation of the parameters of the marginal value of time and detnand means that full information about the model is used in its estimation. The parameters ofthe tnarginal value of time function are those which best ftt the data, in providing the closest match with recreationists' actual choices given relative prices and constraints on time and money they face.
The model is applied to data on gray whale watching along the California coast. The share model is specified using full prices and budgets, with the endogenous marginal value of time function as the tenns of trade between time and money. Based on the econometric results, joint estimation ofthe marginal value of time and the demand (share) model seems superior to conventional treatments of this important variable in the literature. Allowing for differences in the structure of demand between individuals working ftxed versus flexible hours, the demand share and value of time functions are highly significant. The marginal value of time appears to have a more complex relationship with the wage than is allowed for in most conventional treatments in the literature.
It is encouraging that very little additional information is required to implement a recreation demand model fully consistent with the two-constraint requirements. Principally, information on time-budgets is needed beyond what is routinely collected. When labor supply is predetermined relative to recreation choice, the relevant time constraint is nonwork time, and this can be obtained easily through surveys that ask about the respondent's work schedule: how many hours worked per week and how many weeks worked per year. The nonwork time is then the difference between total time in the period of analysis and the time spent working. When, alternatively, labor supply is joint with recreation choice, the relevant timebudget is simply all time during the period of analysis. This does not vary across respondents, but the monetized value of the timebudget does, because the marginal value of time varies. The other important time variables in the two-constraint model, time spent in travel and on site, are commonly collected in recreation demand surveys because of the widespread recognition of the importance of time-prices.
An area for further work is to incorporate the individual's labor supply decision into the framework of this article, as another source of information about the individual's choices that help reveal the marginal value of time. Another possible direction for further work is to allow for the presence of multiple constraints on use of nonwork time. We have presumed a single time constraint, but in reality most people face multiple constraints on their ability to get free for recreational activities. Development of empirical models of preferences that generate both demand and the marginal value of time from the same expenditure or indirect utility functions is a natural generalization to pursue. Hopefully the identification of structural requirements for shadow values herein will assist with and motivate such work. In a sense., it allows researchers to widen the optimization space for finding workable empirical models that better fit observed choices while maintaining consistency with theory.
